Vaccinations in Book Form?

Sounds like a straight (derogatory) version of homoiconicity.

The Mismeasure Of Man

I'm working through this one now, and it's great. Gould was such a great writer, it's no wonder Big Yud sees his work as a threat.

I want to add William H. Tucker’s posthumous “The Bell Curve in Perspective”, which came out I think right at the end of last year. It’s a short, thorough, assessment both of the history of The Bell Curve book itself and what has happened since.

Even the first chapter is just mindblowingly terse in brutally unpacking how (a) it was written by racists, (b) for racist ends, (c) Murray lied and lied afterwards in pretending that ‘only a tiny part of the book was about race’ or whatever

Seconding, Mismeasure of Man is fantastic.

I like ‘Star Wars’ way better. I’m a capitalist. ‘Star Wars’ is the capitalist show. ‘Star Trek’ is the communist one. There is no money in ‘Star Trek’ because you just have the transporter machine that can make anything you need. The whole plot of ‘Star Wars’ starts with Han Solo having this debt that he owes and so the plot in ‘Star Wars’ is driven by money [~Peter Thiel]

Your Honor, my client might've murdered mr. Thiel with a Lego model of a Star Destroyer, but as witnessed by Exhibit A he acted in good faith and as what can only be described as service to the community. We move for full acquittal.

Great article, thanks for posting.

had this open for days now to get around to fully reading it sometime

from just the opening paragraphs, reflecting on it being barely 4y since this article was published: the world would be so much better if people could just learn to internalize that narcissists do, in fact, exist and definitely will lie and hurt you. christ it sucks how much this clown is still given airtime

This one?

Yeah Stross is an excellent corrective to most space colonization wanking.

In general British SF is a bit less hoo-rah! than American.

My graduate degree was in philosophy of science, and I wouldn’t suggest Kuhn or, indeed, much philosophy of science as a salve for this particular problem. For much of the 20th century, the philosophy of science primarily theorised about two main sets of data: (1) idealised physics, which is to say the “final” theories of physics; (2) historical case studies, which is to say the experimental and theoretical debates which produced those theories. These are two distinct strands of research (of which Kuhn belongs to, and plays an important role in introducing, the second), but perspicuous observers will note that neither of them deal with people who get science wrong, rather they deal with either what is “scientific knowledge”, or how it is that scientific “knowledge” is produced.

Now understanding a little better how scientific knowledge is produced, or even that it is produced (and not intuited, Yudkowsky-style, as if given by a beam of pink energy from the future), could be a preliminary inoculation against behaving as if it is intuited, Yudkowsky-style, as if given by a beam of pink energy from the future. Or, in a twist of which many Kuhn readers have fallen afoul, it can be the radicalisation of a would-be “paradigmatic” thinker, who therefore learns that “normal” scientific knowledge is always local, partial, and primarily intended for the NPC types who populate laboratories. If I wanted to turn somebody with the quintessential rationalist personality into a monstrous basilisk-wraith I would give them Kuhn.

I’m not one for delivering the usual bromides against Kuhn’s supposed sloppiness (I think his treatment has been selective and unkind), but there are also better, more recent works in the same vein (and, naturally, Feyerabend did Kuhn better anyway). If I wanted to give somebody “the good shit” from philosophy of science, I would give them Nancy Cartwright, Ian Hacking, and Bas van Frassen. But the problem remains - how do I explain to these people that they aren’t participating in scientific discourse at all? - after all, as we get more and more recent even the very moderate non-objectivisms of Cartwright, Hacking, van Frassen et al. become diluted as, in practical terms, much of philosophy of science converges on the project of once again reifying a now complicated picture of scientific knowledge in the teeth of perceived worries about its objectivity.

Why is this a problem? Well the pragmatic image of science with which your rationalist is liable to come away from these texts is one in which the body of the whole thing is incredibly complex and everything has its role, including that of the rationalist. With Kuhn we will have deepened their appreciation of their own importance, and with the non-objectivists we will have challenged their STEMacism only to supply their project with an undeserved aura of validity!

(I here leave out the really technical stuff, naturally. Much of philosophy of science is of course concerned with resolving particular puzzles in particular areas. This is of course a lot more difficult and worth doing than any grand project we might have in mind, but it can’t help the people we’re discussing).

Only the hardcore realists remain, but what do they have to offer? Idealised physical models! This simply cannot help us at all.

Hell, if they’re anything like a gamut of arseholes I’ve run into over the years, at least a few of them proudly trumpet that back at the turn of the century Bruno Latour was expressing regret about the critical project in STS, and that it’s the only thing of his they’ve ever read.

The great demarcatory projects are, mostly, a thing of the past, but really this is what we need. Problematically, for the last 50 years it has been widely agreed that they were wrong, and there was no real standard of demarcation between “science” and other modes of thought. Nonetheless, and ignoring that there is one good Popperian still alive to do, we can’t use Popper - that’s absurdly dangerous territory - but we do have Lakatos.

Now that’s an idea I could have put at the top. We have to ignore that, as before, people don’t really believe in “degenerating research programmes” anymore (although perhaps philosophy of science is just a little too close to science to say so). But you know what? Fuck it. Make them read Lakatos.

But it won’t help, because their research programme is almost tailor made to outrun scientific testing. Along with history of science, which I advocate because it shows science in its particulars, the real solution is to starve the cult of oxygen. It’s an attritional war of pointing out that this is bullshit in its particulars.

Reading a bit about the history of science is good too. For some reason TESCREAL types are like the Whig historians, science is a constant march towards this, the best of all possible worlds.

I read a small monograph years ago about the history of plate tectonics, and it was clear to me that far from being deluded Bible-huggers, the people who preceded modern ideas of how continents form were grappling with the evidence as they saw it.

Also this overview of "dying sun" SF points out that in the late 19th/early 20th century, what powered the Sun was entirely unknown! https://www.typebarmagazine.com/2024/03/24/science-fiction-and-the-death-of-the-sun/ [1]

Considering that much TESCREAL discourse is less about science and more about science fiction, maybe the focus should be on pointing out the many ways where SF tech goes wrong...

[1] as an aside, I got that link from HN, and the discussions are typically shallow, like most HN discussions about SF https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39911155