We are excited to announce that Arch Linux is entering into a direct
collaboration with Valve. Valve is generously providing backing for two
critical projects that will have a huge impact on our distribution: a
build service infrastructure and a secure signing enclave. By supporting
work on a freelance basis for these topics, Valve enables us to work on
them without being limited solely by the free time of our volunteers.
This opportunity allows us to address some of the biggest outstanding
challenges we have been facing for a while. The collaboration will
speed-up the progress that would otherwise take much longer for us to
achieve, and will ultimately unblock us from finally pursuing some of
our planned endeavors. We are incredibly grateful for Valve to make this
possible and for their explicit commitment to help and support Arch Linux.
These projects will follow our usual development and consensus-building
workflows. [RFCs] will be created for any wide-ranging changes.
Discussions on this mailing list as well as issue, milestone and epic
planning in our GitLab will provide transparency and insight into the
work. We believe this collaboration will greatly benefit Arch Linux, and
are looking forward to share further development on this mailing list as
work progresses.
The Steamdeck was motivation for the collaboration - since it is based on Arch Linux. But as a desktop client they only support ubuntu officially which makes level 1 tech support easier as supporting every distro can be very complex.
Completely fair. They have specific distro they support, and their staff is trained for. Also this seems like you've got some OS level issues independent from steam...
I am curious as per the secure enclave part. Does it mean that they will be signing binaries? Does it mean that we will get secure boot support without self signing? Does it mean that there will be a signing system for the anticheats???
Package signing is used to make sure you only get packages from sources you trust.
Every Linux distro does it and it's why if you add a new source for packages you get asked to accept a key signature.
For a long time, the keys used for signing were just files on disk, and you protected them by protecting the server they were on, but they were technically able to be stolen and used to sign malicious packages.
Some advanced in chip design and cost reductions later, we now have what is often called a "secure enclave", "trusted platform module", or a general provider for a non-exportable key.
It's a little chip that holds or manages a cryptographic key such that it can't (or is exceptionally difficult) to get the signing key off the chip or extract it, making it nearly impossible to steal the key without actually physically stealing the server, which is much easier to prevent by putting it in a room with doors, and impossible to do without detection, making a forged package vastly less likely.
There are services that exist that provide the infrastructure needed to do this, but they cost money and it takes time and money to build it into your system in a way that's reliable and doesn't lock you to a vendor if you ever need to switch for whatever reason.
So I believe this is valve picking up the bill to move archs package infrastructure security up to the top tier.
It was fine before, but that upgrade is expensive for a volunteer and donation based project and cheap for a high profile company that might legitimately be worried about their use of arch on physical hardware increasing the threat interest.
That sounds awesome. I never understood how a TPM can figure out if an attacker can get the keys if the tpm is on the same machine. Does it check independently the signature of the application that asked for the keys?