The situation in Ukraine still favors Kyiv despite the limited progress made in the counteroffensive so far. Ukrainian forces attempted a limited mechanized penetration of prepared Russian defenses in the south in early to mid-June, but failed to break through the Russian lines. They then switched to slower and more careful operations while disrupting Russian rear areas with long-range precision strikes. Ukraine began the next, reportedly main, phase of its counteroffensive on July 26 with a determined drive to penetrate Russian lines in western Zaporizhia Oblast. It’s far too soon to evaluate the outcome of that effort, which is underway as of the time of this writing, but it is vital to manage expectations. Ukrainian forces are fighting now to break through the first line of long-prepared Russian defenses. Several lines lie behind it, stretching for many miles. Ukrainian progress will very likely alternate periods of notable tactical advances with periods, possibly long periods, of pause and some setbacks. Much as we might hope that the road to the Sea of Azov will simply open for Ukrainian forces the odds are high that fighting will remain hard, casualties high, and frustration will be a constant companion. All of which is normal in war.
But the Ukrainian counteroffensive can succeed in any of several ways. First, the current Ukrainian mechanized breakthrough could succeed, and the Ukrainians could exploit it deeply enough to unhinge part or all of the Russian lines. Second, Russian forces, already suffering serious morale and other systemic problems, could break under the pressure and begin to withdraw in a controlled or uncontrolled fashion. Third, a steady pressure and interdiction campaign supported by major efforts such as the one now underway can generate gaps in the Russian lines that Ukrainian forces can exploit at first locally, but then for deeper penetrations. The first and second possibilities are relatively unlikely but possible.
The third is the most probable path to Ukrainian success. It will be slower and more gradual than the other two—and slower than Ukraine’s Western backers desire and expect. It depends on the West providing Ukraine with a constant flow of equipment likely over many months so that Ukraine can maintain its pressure until the Russian forces offer the kinds of frontline cracks the Ukrainians can exploit. It is not primarily a matter of attrition. The slow pace of the pressure campaign Ukraine had been using before July 26 is designed to minimize Ukrainian losses. It is not primarily oriented towards attriting Russians either, but rather towards steadily forcing the Russians out of their prepared defensive positions in ways that the Ukrainians can take advantage of to make operationally significant advances. It is still maneuver warfare rather than attritional warfare, just at a slower pace. It therefore requires patience, but it can succeed.
But don't you know that Russia is actually fighting (and winning) an attrition war with NATO? And that any moment now we will reach the point where we can't ignore anymore how Russia's industry is clearly outproducing NATO by far and also has conquered more territory in the last weeks then Ukraine liberated in months.
Or at least that's the delirious ramblings I get constantly flooded with on social media. I guess the troll brigade is Russia's single semi-competent unit...
If NATO wanted Ukraine to win Russia wouldn't stand a chance but I'm not seeing it happening so far. Russia is on the way to militarize its entire society. Meanwhile in the West, we only see a very slow wakeup.
Russia is focusing everything on building new weapons and ammo. 20-30 tanks each month, maybe even more plus refurbished old vehicles. Meanwhile the West has sent Ukraine what? 60 Leopard 2 and 14 Challenger 2, after more than a year, maybe the 31 Abrams will arrive eventually; That might be a start but I'm not seeing any new large scale production orders being placed. F-16 may arrive some time next year at best, ATACMS are being withheld due to limited stocks and so on. The West keeps delivering only a fraction of what general Zaluzhnyi has requested for a successful counter offensive.
Russia might be a lot weaker than NATO but if Russia is 100% committed it can still win this war as long as NATO only commits 5%. All of this restraint from the West indicates that they either don't care or they might even be afraid of a crushing defeat for Putin. In any case, even that lukewarm support might die down eventually when calls for peace get louder or after a potential Biden defeat in 2024. That's exactly what Putin is hoping for and he might still succeed.
I think Russia is hoping to dig in long enough to see a regime change in the US that puts an end to the steady stream of supplies that they have been sending to Ukraine.
But the Ukrainian counteroffensive can succeed in any of several ways. First, the current Ukrainian mechanized breakthrough could succeed, and the Ukrainians could exploit it deeply enough to unhinge part or all of the Russian lines. Second, Russian forces, already suffering serious morale and other systemic problems, could break under the pressure and begin to withdraw in a controlled or uncontrolled fashion. Third, a steady pressure and interdiction campaign supported by major efforts such as the one now underway can generate gaps in the Russian lines that Ukrainian forces can exploit at first locally, but then for deeper penetrations. The first and second possibilities are relatively unlikely but possible.
If this is going to be done the slow way, via attrition, rather than via an earlier breakthrough, then there is a lot more time involved and might be another option -- tunnelling.
Tunnelling under fortifications does have a pretty extensive history, and with modern technology, I don't know how far one might be able to go.
I don't know what ability to detect tunnelling Russia might have. Aerial surveillance is going to make it hard to hide dirt extracted from anywhere near the front lines, though.
Maybe some sort of small-diameter boring machine powered via cable that could drag a mine-clearing line charge behind it. That'd radically decrease the size of tunnel required down from being human-size, which historically was the required diameter.
It'd depend on the geography, but the front lines are mostly through farmland, so I assume that the dirt goes down a fair bit and that hitting rock isn't an issue.
Tunneling machines would have to enter the ground not far from the front line, would have to be continuously powered, are noisy, have to somehow deal with huge amounts of extracted dirt, entrance is a single vulnerable fixed spot, whole length of tunnel is vulnerable to single shell / drone grenade.
Can't see it happening personally. Esp when nighttime drone ops are stealthier, cheaper and hit faster.
I expect the next evolution will be cheap drones that can pepper an enemy trench with 10+ grenades in a single pass. Or adding some sort of guided capability to better target dug out entrances.
Tunneling machines would have to enter the ground not far from the front line
I'm not sure that that is true, which is what I was mulling over earlier. It would make digging take longer, but there may not really be any fundamental limitations on distance. It's further to move earth, more resistance to cables moving as distance increases. but if you can presumably use "intermediate" points to pump any slurry or whatnot.
would have to be continuously powered
Yeah, but I don't think that that's likely a fundamental limitation. It's a cable.
are noisy
That's what I'm wondering about -- how accurately and how far away a digging machine might be picked up.
Successful tunneling has definitely been done in the past in war. And if you're just using it as a way to get charges in, you don't have to necessarily get all that close to the line. And the diameter doesn't need to be very large, either, if it's just to create space for a line of explosives.
whole length of tunnel is vulnerable to single shell / drone grenade.
Sure, but the same is true of military tunnels in general, and yet they were still done, even with artillery around.
Esp when nighttime drone ops are stealthier, cheaper and hit faster.
The end-of-the-day goal is for Ukraine to get to the Sea of Azov. While I suppose that it's not absolutely impossible to do that with drones, I have a hard time seeing the mechanism.
Are you proposing trying to demine the minefields with just drones? It sounds like, from past articles that I've read, Ukraine might already be trying to do that with artillery, which I suspect is higher-throughput but it's still going to be a slow process and visible -- you're talking about a slow walk of shell craters through the minefield.
Ukrainian commanders told the Financial Times that there was increasing use of heavy artillery instead, intended to clear a path for sappers and infantry units.
The reason that I would expect that one might want to use something like a line charge spanning the minefield or a tunnel filled with explosives is that the clearing happens suddenly, and so it creates a window of time to use the path, to get forces across, before Russia can act in response. If one is visibly and slowly cutting through a minefield, then Russia is going to know that there is a path being cut through the minefield, and has time to prepare a response.
If you're talking about using drones to knock out so many Russian defenses behind minefields that the minefields can be cleared manually before Russia can put reinforcements in, I'm skeptical that that's practical. There are air defenses out there, which is why aircraft aren't being used. If either side could just sweep away the other's forces with drones, I'd expect them to have done so long ago.