Ukrainian Progress: A Breach or a Breakthrough of Russian Lines? - War on the Rocks

My summary, listening through the podcast for people who want text instead:

• Mike: Past two weeks or so, in the north near Kupiansk, things have
  mostly stabilized; Russia has not made significant progress there or
  near Kreminna. Ukrainian forces still trying to take remainder of
  Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. That fight has dragged on, progress
  has been slow. Velyka Novosilka axis had been dormant for some
  time, but Ukraine has been reapplying some limited pressure to
  Russian forces there.

• The main axis of advance in southern Zaporizhzhia from Orikhiv.
  Ukrainian forces have been making advances through heavy
  fortifications and defenses, tunnels. First Russian line of defense
  was stronger than had been expected by open-source analysts; is main
  line of defense. Russia has been pressed back behind that main
  line, now trying to defend town of Verbove and moving to positions
  along second line.

• Q: Is this a breakthrough? A penetration? A: In last few weeks,
  Ukrainian forces have picked up momentum. The extent to which they
  have been able to degrade Russian forces and Russian lines has had
  an effect. Both Ukraine and Russia making use of reserves; comes
  down to who is going to make better use of them. Ukrainian forces
  have had infantry push through first Russian line and are currently
  widening breach to secure against flank attacks. Probably not
  possible for Ukrainian forces to push south without taking town of
  Verbove, which would be on their flank. Russia has rotated in 76th
  airborne units, rotated out motor rifle units that had held areas.
  Probably best described as a breach. Not best described as a
  breakthrough, because that requires exploitation, ability to move
  vehicles through.

• Q: Has offensive been successful? A: Narratives have been shifting.
  At first, was very pessimistic one, now some assessments seem more
  positive. Ukrainian approach has clearly achieved some results,
  however, Russian military does not seem to be pressured enough to be
  at risk of collapse. Russian military not that confident about
  being able to hold with units that they have. Many unknowns that we
  cannot see on battlefield. Main constraints on offensive are
  remaining combat strength and remaining artillery munitions, and
  weather. Weather may get worse around end of October or so. Not
  clear how long offensive will run; could continue into winter.
  Still too early to say result of offensive.

• Q: How was your earlier piece, Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive at Three Months
  received? A: Was received well. RUSI also put out piece same
  morning, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,
  which came to similar conclusions despite not reviewing each other's
  works. RUSI report focused on Velyka Novosilka axis, Kofman and Lee
  focused on Orikhiv and Bakhmut. Similar conclusions on Russian
  adaptations and Ukrainian challenges, how action was conducted, how
  Western training needs to change. Similar ideas on what Ukrainian
  forces need. Kofman feels that this is about as much validation as
  can reasonably do, given the state of the war and information at
  this point.

• Q: You proposed not bringing in new weapons so much as bringing in
  weapons already being brought in, faster and sooner. Could you
  expand on this? A: I focused on scaling up training, doing it
  sooner so there are more than 3-4 months. Need to line up with
  supporting capabilities and planning for future offensive starting
  sooner than was done for current offensive.

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