Nick Danforth sat down with Mike Kofman to discuss the state of the Ukrainian offensive three months in, as well as the challenges of assessing it. Mike
Nick Danforth sat down with Mike Kofman to discuss the state of the Ukrainian offensive three months in, as well as the challenges of assessing it.
My summary, listening through the podcast for people who want text instead:
Mike: Past two weeks or so, in the north near Kupiansk, things have
mostly stabilized; Russia has not made significant progress there or
near Kreminna. Ukrainian forces still trying to take remainder of
Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. That fight has dragged on, progress
has been slow. Velyka Novosilka axis had been dormant for some
time, but Ukraine has been reapplying some limited pressure to
Russian forces there.
The main axis of advance in southern Zaporizhzhia from Orikhiv.
Ukrainian forces have been making advances through heavy
fortifications and defenses, tunnels. First Russian line of defense
was stronger than had been expected by open-source analysts; is main
line of defense. Russia has been pressed back behind that main
line, now trying to defend town of Verbove and moving to positions
along second line.
Q: Is this a breakthrough? A penetration? A: In last few weeks,
Ukrainian forces have picked up momentum. The extent to which they
have been able to degrade Russian forces and Russian lines has had
an effect. Both Ukraine and Russia making use of reserves; comes
down to who is going to make better use of them. Ukrainian forces
have had infantry push through first Russian line and are currently
widening breach to secure against flank attacks. Probably not
possible for Ukrainian forces to push south without taking town of
Verbove, which would be on their flank. Russia has rotated in 76th
airborne units, rotated out motor rifle units that had held areas.
Probably best described as a breach. Not best described as a
breakthrough, because that requires exploitation, ability to move
vehicles through.
Q: Has offensive been successful? A: Narratives have been shifting.
At first, was very pessimistic one, now some assessments seem more
positive. Ukrainian approach has clearly achieved some results,
however, Russian military does not seem to be pressured enough to be
at risk of collapse. Russian military not that confident about
being able to hold with units that they have. Many unknowns that we
cannot see on battlefield. Main constraints on offensive are
remaining combat strength and remaining artillery munitions, and
weather. Weather may get worse around end of October or so. Not
clear how long offensive will run; could continue into winter.
Still too early to say result of offensive.
Q: How was your earlier piece, Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive at Three Months
received? A: Was received well. RUSI also put out piece same
morning, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,
which came to similar conclusions despite not reviewing each other's
works. RUSI report focused on Velyka Novosilka axis, Kofman and Lee
focused on Orikhiv and Bakhmut. Similar conclusions on Russian
adaptations and Ukrainian challenges, how action was conducted, how
Western training needs to change. Similar ideas on what Ukrainian
forces need. Kofman feels that this is about as much validation as
can reasonably do, given the state of the war and information at
this point.
Q: You proposed not bringing in new weapons so much as bringing in
weapons already being brought in, faster and sooner. Could you
expand on this? A: I focused on scaling up training, doing it
sooner so there are more than 3-4 months. Need to line up with
supporting capabilities and planning for future offensive starting
sooner than was done for current offensive.
Things to look at, ways to help Ukrainian forces maintain pressure
on Russian forces going into winter. Possible that Ukrainian
military will become exhausted, like last fall. Probably what
Russian military anticipates, don't want to let Russia comfortably
spend time digging in, reconstituting forces. Russia probably going
to conduct another critical infrastructure strike campaign against
Ukrainian cities, trying to make them uninhabitable, destroy viability as
state. That means that air defense is going to become a priority
again. Russia's strategic campaign did not succeed last year, but
situation in December was somewhat-precarious. Ukrainian air
defenses have gotten much better, gotten more equipment from West.
Not clear whether this is going to be a cold or warm winter.
Russian offensive potential remains weak in Kofman's view; without
significant mobilization, have hard time to regenerate much
offensive power. Should not discount possibility of additional
Russian mobilization. Conversations on next year's offensive needs
to start now; even if this offensive is successful, likely not to
liberate extent of territory that Ukraine and western countries had
hoped. Don't want to have a last-minute approach next year the way
we did this year. Need to have commitments for equipment, etc, in
September, not January. Training efforts are scaling up. Artillery
ammunition probably going to be biggest constraint. One of biggest
issues going to be coming up with enough both to let Ukraine sustain
defenses and also to set aside enough to allow for offensives.
Russia also increasing production, Russia trying to buy from North
Korea, Iran. West needs to accept that this is going to be a long
war and be willing to tolerate that; the opportunities for this to
be a short war have passed. Russian forces could have collapsed
last fall or Prighozin's mutinty have caused a coup or collapse, but
those didn't happen. Can't know yet, but increasingly likely that
Ukraine will not be able to decisively drive all the way to the
coast in this offensive. Need to focus conversation on long-term
outcome of war, long-term investments.
On Prighozin's death: Sounds like Prighozin's final mistake was
coming back to challenge breakup of Wagner; not clear that he was
always going to be killed, though Kofman would never have bet much
on Putin's deal with Prighozin holding. Happy to see end of
Prighozin; Western media tended to uncritically quote Prighozin,
though he is not a reliable source. Wagner as an organization will
probably continue in some form. Experienced fighters will stay
around. Probably will be hard to fully replace Wagner, but we will
see. Wagner may be back. Russian Ministry of Defense is requiring
that people who want to fight in Ukraine need to take an oath. How
important was Wagner? Was mostly fighting for Bakhmut, which wasn't
really decisive in the conflict. Perhaps Wagner's main impact was
in December or January last winter, when Russian military was very
vulnerable and desperate to stabilize lines.