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Ukrainian Progress: A Breach or a Breakthrough of Russian Lines? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com Ukrainian Progress: A Breach or a Breakthrough of Russian Lines? - War on the Rocks

Nick Danforth sat down with Mike Kofman to discuss the state of the Ukrainian offensive three months in, as well as the challenges of assessing it. Mike

Ukrainian Progress: A Breach or a Breakthrough of Russian Lines? - War on the Rocks

Nick Danforth sat down with Mike Kofman to discuss the state of the Ukrainian offensive three months in, as well as the challenges of assessing it.

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  • My summary, listening through the podcast for people who want text instead:

    • Mike: Past two weeks or so, in the north near Kupiansk, things have
      mostly stabilized; Russia has not made significant progress there or
      near Kreminna. Ukrainian forces still trying to take remainder of
      Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. That fight has dragged on, progress
      has been slow. Velyka Novosilka axis had been dormant for some
      time, but Ukraine has been reapplying some limited pressure to
      Russian forces there.

    • The main axis of advance in southern Zaporizhzhia from Orikhiv.
      Ukrainian forces have been making advances through heavy
      fortifications and defenses, tunnels. First Russian line of defense
      was stronger than had been expected by open-source analysts; is main
      line of defense. Russia has been pressed back behind that main
      line, now trying to defend town of Verbove and moving to positions
      along second line.

    • Q: Is this a breakthrough? A penetration? A: In last few weeks,
      Ukrainian forces have picked up momentum. The extent to which they
      have been able to degrade Russian forces and Russian lines has had
      an effect. Both Ukraine and Russia making use of reserves; comes
      down to who is going to make better use of them. Ukrainian forces
      have had infantry push through first Russian line and are currently
      widening breach to secure against flank attacks. Probably not
      possible for Ukrainian forces to push south without taking town of
      Verbove, which would be on their flank. Russia has rotated in 76th
      airborne units, rotated out motor rifle units that had held areas.
      Probably best described as a breach. Not best described as a
      breakthrough, because that requires exploitation, ability to move
      vehicles through.

    • Q: Has offensive been successful? A: Narratives have been shifting.
      At first, was very pessimistic one, now some assessments seem more
      positive. Ukrainian approach has clearly achieved some results,
      however, Russian military does not seem to be pressured enough to be
      at risk of collapse. Russian military not that confident about
      being able to hold with units that they have. Many unknowns that we
      cannot see on battlefield. Main constraints on offensive are
      remaining combat strength and remaining artillery munitions, and
      weather. Weather may get worse around end of October or so. Not
      clear how long offensive will run; could continue into winter.
      Still too early to say result of offensive.

    • Q: How was your earlier piece, Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive at Three Months
      received? A: Was received well. RUSI also put out piece same
      morning, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,
      which came to similar conclusions despite not reviewing each other's
      works. RUSI report focused on Velyka Novosilka axis, Kofman and Lee
      focused on Orikhiv and Bakhmut. Similar conclusions on Russian
      adaptations and Ukrainian challenges, how action was conducted, how
      Western training needs to change. Similar ideas on what Ukrainian
      forces need. Kofman feels that this is about as much validation as
      can reasonably do, given the state of the war and information at
      this point.

    • Q: You proposed not bringing in new weapons so much as bringing in
      weapons already being brought in, faster and sooner. Could you
      expand on this? A: I focused on scaling up training, doing it
      sooner so there are more than 3-4 months. Need to line up with
      supporting capabilities and planning for future offensive starting
      sooner than was done for current offensive.

    [continued in child]

    • [continued from parent]

      • Things to look at, ways to help Ukrainian forces maintain pressure
        on Russian forces going into winter. Possible that Ukrainian
        military will become exhausted, like last fall. Probably what
        Russian military anticipates, don't want to let Russia comfortably
        spend time digging in, reconstituting forces. Russia probably going
        to conduct another critical infrastructure strike campaign against
        Ukrainian cities, trying to make them uninhabitable, destroy viability as
        state. That means that air defense is going to become a priority
        again. Russia's strategic campaign did not succeed last year, but
        situation in December was somewhat-precarious. Ukrainian air
        defenses have gotten much better, gotten more equipment from West.
        Not clear whether this is going to be a cold or warm winter.
        Russian offensive potential remains weak in Kofman's view; without
        significant mobilization, have hard time to regenerate much
        offensive power. Should not discount possibility of additional
        Russian mobilization. Conversations on next year's offensive needs
        to start now; even if this offensive is successful, likely not to
        liberate extent of territory that Ukraine and western countries had
        hoped. Don't want to have a last-minute approach next year the way
        we did this year. Need to have commitments for equipment, etc, in
        September, not January. Training efforts are scaling up. Artillery
        ammunition probably going to be biggest constraint. One of biggest
        issues going to be coming up with enough both to let Ukraine sustain
        defenses and also to set aside enough to allow for offensives.
        Russia also increasing production, Russia trying to buy from North
        Korea, Iran. West needs to accept that this is going to be a long
        war and be willing to tolerate that; the opportunities for this to
        be a short war have passed. Russian forces could have collapsed
        last fall or Prighozin's mutinty have caused a coup or collapse, but
        those didn't happen. Can't know yet, but increasingly likely that
        Ukraine will not be able to decisively drive all the way to the
        coast in this offensive. Need to focus conversation on long-term
        outcome of war, long-term investments.

      • On Prighozin's death: Sounds like Prighozin's final mistake was
        coming back to challenge breakup of Wagner; not clear that he was
        always going to be killed, though Kofman would never have bet much
        on Putin's deal with Prighozin holding. Happy to see end of
        Prighozin; Western media tended to uncritically quote Prighozin,
        though he is not a reliable source. Wagner as an organization will
        probably continue in some form. Experienced fighters will stay
        around. Probably will be hard to fully replace Wagner, but we will
        see. Wagner may be back. Russian Ministry of Defense is requiring
        that people who want to fight in Ukraine need to take an oath. How
        important was Wagner? Was mostly fighting for Bakhmut, which wasn't
        really decisive in the conflict. Perhaps Wagner's main impact was
        in December or January last winter, when Russian military was very
        vulnerable and desperate to stabilize lines.